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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950399-CA 
v. : 
RONNIE C. BYRD, : Priority No. 2 
De f endant/Appe11ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION ANP NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Ronnie Byrd appeals his conviction for two counts 
of possession of a controlled substance, third degree felonies, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (1996) (R. 121-
22). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion 
for a new trial based on testimony referring to defendant's post-
arrest silence where defendant affirmatively waived his right to 
remain silent and subsequently confessed to purchasing the seized 
narcotics? 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion 
for a new trial based on the State's failure to inform defense 
counsel about changed testimony where the change did not impair 
defendant's ability to present his theory of the case? 
The standard of review is the same for both issues. The 
trial court has a "wide range of discretion in determining" 
whether to grant a motion for a new trial. State v. James, 819 
P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). This Court assumes that the trial 
court properly exercised its discretion "unless the record 
clearly shows the contrary." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ANP RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1) (b) (ii) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with two counts of unlawfully 
possessing a controlled substance, third degree felonies, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (ii) (1996) (R. 7) . 
The jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 121-22). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent prison 
terms of zero-to-five years (R. 201-202). Defendant timely filed 
a motion for a new trial (R. 135). The trial court denied the 
motion, and defendant timely filed his notice of appeal from the 
denial (R. 209). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 12, 1993, a surveillance team watched Pioneer 
Park for drug activities (R. 358-59). In the early evening, that 
team consisted of one surveillance officer and a "take-down" unit 
consisting of a marked police car driven by a uniformed officer, 
Officer Kaufman, and an unmarked car driven by a plain clothes 
detective, Detective Thurgood (R. 358-59, 408-409, 471, 474-75). 
Officer Grant watched the north curb from the team's 
surveillance station on the second story of a building across the 
street (R. 359-60) . When Officer Grant observed a tan Escort 
station wagon pull up, he focused his camera on the car, then 
moved to his sixty-power spotting scope to observe the car (R. 
362-65, 370). A man approached the passenger side of the car 
where defendant was seated, appeared to have a short conversation 
defendant, then walked away (R. 370-71, 482). 
A second man ("seller") approached the passenger side (R. 
371). This man carried a "twist" (a package commonly containing 
cocaine) between his thumb and forefinger (R. 354-55, 371). The 
seller also appeared to speak to defendant (R. 371). The seller 
then turned his back to Officer Grant, and when he turned around 
again, he held a larger plastic bag that appeared to have several 
twists in it (R. 371-72). 
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The seller passed the original twist into the car, then took 
something else from the bag and passed that into the car (R. 
372). Defendant then handed the second man some cash, and the 
car left (id.). 
Officer Grant radioed the take-down unit that the passenger 
in the Escort had purchased drugs (R. 410, 479). Detective 
Thurgood followed the car, and Officer Kaufman joined him (R. 
411, 479-80). Officer Kaufman signaled the car to stop; although 
the drive eventually complied, he took longer the usual to stop 
(R. 411). Officer Kaufman approached the driver and spoke to the 
driver and rear passenger while Detective Thurgood removed 
defendant from the front passenger side (R. 411, 414, 482-83). 
Detective Thurgood took defendant to the rear of the Escort where 
he arrested defendant and informed him of his Miranda rights (R. 
483). Detective Thurgood then searched the front passenger area 
and discovered a "twist" of cocaine and a "chip" of heroin under 
the front passenger seat (R. 484-85). 
On the way to jail, defendant admitted to Detective Thurgood 
that he had purchased the drugs seized (R. 490). At trial, 
defendant admitted that a drug purchase took place, but testified 
that the driver purchased a package of "white" (cocaine) and one 
of "black" (heroin) (R. 560-61). 
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The argument sections contain additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Post-arrest silence. Defendant claims that the 
prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by 
eliciting testimony about his post-arrest silence, as proscribed 
by Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); therefore, according to 
defendant, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 
defendant's motion for a new trial based on the post-arrest 
silence evidence. Defendant's argument fails because: 1) he 
waived his right to remain silent and agreed to talk to the 
police; therefore, the Doyle proscription does not apply; and 2) 
the record contains overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, 
including his confession. 
2. Failure tP disclose incvlpfltpry infprTTifrtipn. Defendant 
also contends that the trial court should have granted his motion 
for a new trial because one of the State's witnesses refreshed 
his memory and consequently gave a different account at trial 
than he gave defense counsel during a pre-trial interview. 
Defendant argues that, had his counsel know about the change, she 
could have tailored the defense accordingly. The trial court 
correctly found that any error was harmless. Defense counsel 
presented a coherent defense based on the evidence introduced. 
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On the other hand, the State presented overwhelming evidence of 
defendant's guilt. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. Defendant based his motion on two arguments: 1) that the 
prosecutor elicited testimony commenting on defendant's post-
arrest silence; and 2) that a State's witness gave a different 
account at trial than he gave defense counsel during their 
interview. In determining whether the trial court erroneously-
denied the motion, this Court allows the trial court a "wide 
range of discretion". State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 
1991). This Court must assume the trial court properly exercised 
its discretion "unless the record clearly shows the contrary." 
Id. For the reasons argued below, defendant has not shown that 
the trial court exceeded the wide discretion it had to deny 
defendant's motion. 
POINT I 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S POST-ARREST SILENCE 
DID NOT JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAIVED 
HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND CONFESSED TO THE CRIME 
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted 
his motion for a new trial because, according to defendant, the 
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State erroneously elicited testimony from the investigating 
police officer concerning his post-arrest silence, and 
erroneously cross-examined him about his failure to given the 
officer the exculpatory version he told the jury. Appellant's 
Brief at 8-14. Under the facts of this case, the trial court 
properly denied the motion because: 1) defendant waived his right 
to remain silent; therefore, the proscription against commenting 
on post-arrest silence did not apply; and 2) any violation was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Detective Thurgood testified that, after the stop, he 
immediately arrested defendant and gave defendant a Miranda 
warning (R. 483) . Defendant said that he understood his rights 
and wanted to talk to Detective Thurgood (R. 483, 487). 
Detective Thurgood told defendant that he had a videotape of 
defendant buying drugs in Pioneer Park; defendant did not respond 
(R. 4 84). Detective Thurgood then left defendant in another 
officer's custody and searched the car (id.). 
The next time Detective Thurgood talked to defendant, he 
said to defendant, "What's up, what's going on?" (R. 488, 490). 
Defendant responded "that he just wanted to get high, and that he 
purchased the drugs at Pioneer Park" (R. 490). 
During cross examination, the prosecutor asked defendant 
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whether he ever told Detective Thurgood that the driver had 
bought the drugs; defendant responded that he did not say 
anything about drugs to anybody (R. 600-601). 
Defendant claims that both Detective Thurman's testimony and 
the cross-examination amounted to inappropriate comments on his 
post-arrest silence. Appellant's Brief at 8-14. Therefore, 
defendant's argument refers to two silences: 1) his failure to 
respond to a declaratory statement from Detective Thurman that 
did not ask for a response from defendant; and 2) his failure to 
tell Detective Thurman the exculpatory version he told the jury. 
A. Doyle does not apply because defendant waived his right 
to remain gilent. 
The trial court did not determine whether the comments 
violated Doyle. relying instead on its determination that any 
error was harmless (R. 207). Nevertheless, Doyle elicited 
testimony did not violate Doyle because Doyle does not apply to 
this case.1 
In Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the State violated the defendants' right 
^his court "may affirm the trial courtfs decision to admit 
evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 
1313, 1316 (Utah 1986) (citation omitted). 
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to due process of law when it used the defendant's post-arrest, 
post-Miranda-warning silence to impeach the defendant. Id. at 
618-19. In Doyle, the defendants took the stand and gave an 
exculpatory version of the events. Id. at 613-14. In cross-
examination, the prosecutor used the defendants' post-Miranda 
silence to impeach the exculpatory testimony. Id. at 614-15. 
The Supreme Court found that this violated due process because 
the Miranda warnings implied an assurance that no penalty would 
follow from remaining silent, and because post-Miranda silence 
"may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these 
Miranda rights." Id. at 618-19. 
Since Doyle, the Supreme Court has limited its application 
to post-Miranda-warning silence. For example, the Court refused 
to extend Doyle to comments on a defendant's pre-arrest silence. 
Jenkins v. Anderson. 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980). Similarly, the 
Court refused to extend the Doyle proscription to comments on 
post-arrest, but pre-Miranda-warning silence. Fletcher v. Weir. 
455 U.S. 603, 606 (1982). Also, when a defendant waives his 
right to remain silent and tells police a story inconsistent with 
his trial testimony, the State may use the inconsistency to 
impeach defendant without violating the Doyle proscription. 
Anderson v. Charles. 447 U.S. 404, 407-10 (1980). In all three 
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cases, the Court distinguished Doyle because the government did 
not induce the defendants' silence by giving the Miranda 
warnings. Jenkins v. Anderson. 447 U.S. at 241; Fletcher v. 
Weir. 455 U.S. at 607; An<fergPP v* Chfrrleg, 447 U.S. at 409. 
Similarly, the Miranda warnings in this case did not induce 
defendant to remain silent. To the contrary, defendant told 
Detective Thurman that he understood his Miranda rights and 
wanted to talk to the detective (R. 483, 487). Shortly after 
affirmatively waiving those rights, defendant confessed "that he 
just wanted to get high, and that he purchased the drugs at 
Pioneer Park" (R. 490). Because Detective Thurman's Miranda 
warnings did not induce silence, the Doyle proscription does not 
apply. Consequently, the State could elicit testimony about 
defendant's post-arrest failure to respond to a declaratory 
statement and post-arrest failure to give the exculpatory version 
he told the jury. 
This Court reached a similar conclusion in State v. 
Harrison. 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.), cert - denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991) . Harrison was convicted of murder after shooting 
another man outside a nightclub. At trial, Harrison contended 
that he shot the victim after he saw a revolver in the victim's 
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waistband. The prosecutor commented: 
The most incredible story, the added detail of the 
chrome plated revolver that he saw so well from a 
distance of fifteen feet sticking out of the waistband 
of the dead man. Waistband? Waistband? On a dark end 
street with some back lit things from the Persepolis 
restaurant? Hefs so sure he saw that that hefs willing 
to kill a man. No, that's an added detail. He made that 
up later. He never tells anybody about that. 
Id. at 787 (emphasis added). Harrison contended that the comment 
violated Doyle because the prosecutor used his failure to give 
his exculpatory explanation to police to impeach his trial 
testimony. Id. This Court held that Doyle did not apply because 
the record contained no evidence that Harrison ever invoked his 
right to remain silent. Id. at 788. 
In this case, defendant not only failed to invoke his right, 
he affirmatively waived it. In this case, as in Harrison. Doyle 
did not proscribe Detective Thurgood's testimony or the 
prosecutor's cross-examination questions. 
Additionally, defendant's trial testimony independently 
justified the State's cross-examination about defendant's failure 
to tell Detective Thurman that the driver, not he, purchased the 
drugs. When a defendant waives his right to remain silent and 
gives police a statement, but then gives an inconsistent 
statement version at trial, the State may impeach the defendant 
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with his failure to give the trial version to the police. 
Anderson v. Charles. 447 U.S. at 409; State v. Velarde. 675 P.2d 
1194, 1195-96 (Utah 1984). In that circumstance, the 
prosecutor's questioning does not comment on the defendant's 
exercise of his right to remain silent; rather, it asks defendant 
to explain why, if he testified truthfully, he did not tell 
police the same story. Anderson v. Charles. 447 U.S. at 409. 
In Velarde. Velarde told the jury a different version of the 
events than he told the arresting officer. State v. Velarde. 675 
P.2d at 1195. On cross-examination, the prosecutor "asked why 
[Velarde] had not told the officer that which he had testified to 
on direct examination." Id. The supreme court concluded that 
the prosecutor legitimately used the failure to give the 
exculpatory version to police as a means to impeach Velarde. Id. 
at 1195-96. 
In this case, as in Velarde, the State properly impeached 
defendant's trial testimony with his failure to recount to 
Detective Thurgood the same version of the events that he 
recounted to the jury. Defendant told Detective Thurgood that he 
purchased the drugs. At trial, however, he testified that the 
driver, not he, purchased the drugs, that he never even touched 
the drugs, that he was just haplessly present when the driver 
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made the purchase, and that he was outraged that the driver 
involved him in the transaction (R. 556-63, 614-16). Under 
Velarde, the State could properly point out that defendant did 
not give this version to police. 
Finally, although defendant waived his right to remain 
silent, he could have invoked that right at any time during 
questioning. See, e.g., State v. Gutierrez. 864 P.2d 894, 898-99 
(Utah App. 1993). However, invoking the right after an initial 
valid waiver requires the defendant to invoke the right 
''sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the 
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for 
an attorney." Davis v. U.S.. 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 
(1994)(requiring a clear request for counsel following an initial 
waiver of that right). £££. also Coleman v. Sinaletary. 3 0 F.3d 
1420, 1421 (11th Cir. 1994)(applying the Davis standard to 
subsequent invocations of the right to remain silent), cert, 
denied. 115 S. Ct. 1801 (1995); State v. Leyva. 906 P.2d 894, 901 
n.3 (Utah App. 1995)(recognizing the Davis standard for an 
invocation of either right following an initial valid waiver), 
cert, granted. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996).2 
2Although this Court acknowledged in Leyva that Davis 
applies to cases like this where the defendant initially waives 
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Defendant has not argued and cannot show a subsequent 
invocation of his right to remain silent. Detective Thurgood 
informed defendant of his Miranda rights, and defendant 
affirmatively waived them (R. 483, 487). Detective Thurgood then 
told defendant that he had a video tape of defendant purchasing 
drugs; defendant did not respond (R. 484). The next time 
Detective Thurgood spoke to defendant, he asked defendant what 
happened and defendant confessed to purchasing the drugs (R. 4 88-
490). At no time did defendant make any statement or do anything 
that a reasonable officer would have understood amounted to 
invoking his right to silence, including his failure to respond 
to the detective's single statement that did not directly ask for 
defendant to respond. 
In sum, the Doyle proscription against using post-arrest 
silence to impeach defendant does not apply to this case. The 
Miranda warnings did not induce silence; to the contrary, 
defendant affirmatively waived his rights and ultimately 
confessed. Moreover, he testified at trial to a version of the 
his Miranda rights, the Court also held that it did not apply to 
cases where the initial waiver was ambiguous. State v. Leyva, 
906 P.2d at 899-901. The State disagrees with that portion of 
Leyva, and the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
review the question. 
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events different from that he recounted to the police. Finally, 
he never invoked his right to silence after he waived it; at 
most, he failed to respond to one statement from Detective 
Thurgood that did not elicit a response. Therefore, the trial 
court correctly denied his motion for a new trial on this basis. 
B. Alternativelyi references to defendant's post-Miranda 
silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial 
because it found that, even assuming an error occurred, the error 
had not prejudiced defendant (R. 207). Because any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the record fails to show that 
the trial court clearly abused its discretion. See State v. 
Bartley. 784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah App. 1989)(applying the 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to an alleged Doyle 
violation). 
A number of factors help determine whether an error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, including the strength of the 
State's case. State v. Villareal. 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 
1995)(citation omitted). In this case, the record contains 
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt independent from the 
testimony and cross-examination about which defendant complains. 
Most significantly, defendant admitted to Detective Thurgood that 
15 
he purchased the drugs because he wanted to get high (R. 4 90) .3 
Defendant also excessively minimizes the circumstantial 
evidence against him, acknowledging only Officer Grant's 
testimony and the videotape. Appellant's Brief at 11. However, 
when considered in its totality, the circumstantial establishes 
that defendant, not the driver, purchased the drugs. 
Officer Grant testified that he saw two people approach the 
open, front passenger, not driver, window (R. 370-71). The first 
man left, the second engaged in what Officer Grant's experience 
told him was a drug transaction (R. 371-72). No one approached 
the driver's window. Officer Grant saw no movements to suggest 
that the driver leaned over to purchase the drugs, and defendant 
denied that he had passed the drugs or the money between the 
driver and the seller (R. 385, 562). Officer Grant saw the 
passenger pass money out of the window to the seller (R. 372). 
When Officer Kaufman and Detective Thurgood pulled the Escort 
over, they found defendant in the front passenger seat (R. 412, 
482) . 
defendant attempts to dismiss his confession as incredible. 
Appellant's Brief at 11. Defendant's argument ignores that, on 
appeal, credibility determinations are resolved against him. Cf. 
State v. Gordon. 913 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996) (on appeal from a jury 
verdict, the appellate courts view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to that verdict). 
16 
Defendant admitted that the drug transaction occurred at 
Pioneer park, but denied confessing to the police and testified 
that the driver, not he, purchased "white" (cocaine) and "black" 
(heroin) (R. 560-61), Defendant's use of the street names showed 
he was no novice on the topic. Moreover, Detective Thurgood 
found cocaine and heroin under defendant's, not the driver's, 
seat; there was nothing else under the passenger's seat (R. 485, 
491-93). Defendant acknowledged that he never saw the driver or 
rear passenger put the cocaine and heroin under his seat (R. 589, 
592, 611). Detective Thurgood testified that the driver could 
not have placed it under defendant's seat because the seat rails 
blocked the way (R. 525). Defendant conjectured only that the 
cocaine and heroin discovered may have been left there from 
another purchase, and that the driver may have kept the cocaine 
and heroin from that day's purchase in his pocket (R. 588, 590). 
At trial, defendant gave an incredible explanation about how 
he ended up innocently involved in a drug transaction, an 
explanation completely inconsistent with he pretrial confession. 
Defendant contended that he paid the driver five dollars to take 
him to see his girlfriend at about 400 East and 900 South, and 
that the driver took him to Pioneer Park first (R. 552). After 
the transaction, however, the Escort headed north toward 
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defendant's residence (R. 593-94, 616). Defendant also 
acknowledged that he was considerably larger than the driver and 
rear passenger, that he was not afraid of them, and that he could 
have left the car at any time (R. 587). 
At trial, defendant partially bolstered his testimony by 
contending that the driver offered the officer an incredible 
explanation for going to Pioneer Park: that he went there to see 
a friend (R. 436). Even if incredible, the incredibility does 
not negate the evidence identifying defendant as the purchaser; 
at most, it suggests that the driver knew the purpose of going to 
the park from the beginning. 
In support of his argument that the references to his 
silence prejudiced his case, defendant contends that the 
references were not "isolated" because there were two: Detective 
Thurgood's testimony and the prosecutor's cross-examination. 
Appellant's Brief at 12. Although there were two references, 
they were distinct and occurred at different times in the 
evidence (R. 490, 600-601). Moreover, the prosecutor made no 
reference to defendant's silence in his closing argument (R. 623-
31). When weighed against his confession and the other 
circumstantial evidence of his guilt, these two brief references 
are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Finally, defendant also complains that the trial court gave 
no immediate curative instruction. Appellant's Brief at 13. 
However, nothing in the record even suggests that defendant 
requested one. Having failed to request a curative instruction, 
defendant cannot complain on appeal when the trial court did not 
give one. See, e.g., State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 61 (Utah 
1982), overruled on other grounds/ state vT Long/ 721 P.2d 483 
(Utah 1986) . 
Based on the above, any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This independently establishes that the trial 
court did not abuse its wide discretion when it denied 
defendant's motion for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE FAILURE TO INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL ABOUT A CHANGE IN 
TESTIMONY DID NOT IMPAIR DEFENDANT'S ABILITY TO PRESENT 
A DEFENSE; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Prior to trial, defense counsel interviewed Officer Kaufman, 
who told counsel that he could not remember if he searched the 
Escort (R. 419). Detective Thurgood only searched the area 
around the passenger seat (R. 484-85). In her opening statement, 
defense counsel pointed out purported inadequacies in the State's 
investigation, including the failure to search the entire Escort 
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(R. 349-50) . At trial, Officer Kaufman testified that he had 
refreshed his memory and remembered searching the entire Escort 
(R. 419). He admitted in front of the jury, however, that he had 
not informed defense counsel of his refreshed memory, and that he 
originally told counsel that he could not remember searching the 
entire car (R. 421). The prosecutor first learned of the change 
the morning trial began, but did not inform defense counsel about 
the change (R. 468). 
Defendant included the failure to inform the defense about 
the change in Officer Kaufman's memory to support his motion for 
a new trial (R. 135-38). The trial court denied the motion (R. 
207). Because the trial court found any error harmless, it did 
not decide whether the State had violated its discovery 
obligations. 
On appeal, defendant contends that Officer Kaufman's changed 
memory harmed his defense because, if counsel had known about it, 
counsel could have developed a theory consistent with the 
evidence. Specifically, defendant contends that, if counsel had 
known about the change, she ucould have altered and salvaged the 
defense, by focusing solely on the state's failure to investigate 
and search the other occupants of the car, without putting the 
credibility of the defense in issue." Appellant's Brief at 16. 
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A prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered 
inculpatory evidence "might so mislead defendant as to cause 
prejudicial error." State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 
1985). If defendant can make a credible argument that failing to 
disclose inculpatory evidence impaired the defense, the burden 
shifts to the State to establish that there exists no reasonable 
likelihood of a better result. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 
921 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, defendant has not met the threshold to shift 
the burden to the State. Despite the change in Officer Kaufman's 
testimony, defendant presented the jury with a cohesive defense. 
Defendant asserted that the State's evidence was consistent with 
his testimony that the driver, not he, purchased the drugs (R. 
631-51). For example, defense counsel pointed out that Officer 
Grant could not see what was going on in the car, and 
specifically could not see what the driver was doing during the 
purchase (R. 634-35). Counsel also pointed out that Detective 
Thurgood found the drugs in the middle of the floor below the two 
foot by two foot seat, and that Officer Kaufman could not see 
what the other two occupants were doing during the time it took 
the driver to pull over (R. 642). 
Defense counsel also relied on the driver's and rear 
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passenger's suspicious behavior to suggest that the officers 
improperly failed to investigate them, and that, if the officers 
had, they might have discovered evidence supporting defendant's 
testimony. Defense counsel pointed out that the driver took 
three quarters of a block to pull over, that the driver gave 
Officer Kaufman an incredible explanation for not pulling over 
when Officer Kaufman first turned on his lights and siren (that 
he did not see Kaufman only two cars behind him), that the driver 
gave an incredible explanation for going to Pioneer Park (that he 
went there to see a friend), and that he gave an incredible 
explanation for wanting to leave the scene (that he had left 
something cooking on the stove when he went to the park to see a 
friend) (R. 639-40). Counsel then pointed out that, despite this 
suspicious behavior, the police let the driver and rear passenger 
leave without searching them (R, 640). 
Counsel also pointed out that the drug packages Officer 
Grant saw during the purchase were sufficiently small to put into 
a pocket or a sock (R. 637-38), but that Officer Kaufman released 
the driver and rear passenger without searching either of them 
(R. 640). Counsel developed the theme that the police acted on 
Officer Grant's report that the passenger (defendant) purchased 
the drugs and consequently narrowed their investigation to the 
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point that they could have easily overlooked evidence inculpating 
the other occupants (R. 637-39, 646-49). 
The argument and evidence summarized above rebuts any claim 
that the changed memory impaired the defense. Therefore, 
defendant has not established the threshold to shift the burden 
to the State to establish that, had the State disclosed the 
memory change, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result. 
Even if this Court did shift the burden to the State to 
establish the absence of prejudice, the record establishes that 
there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. 
First, as established, defendant still presented a defense based 
on the evidence introduced. 
Second, defense counsel used the changed memory to attack 
Officer Kaufman's general credibility and to attack the 
credibility of the State's case. On cross examination, Officer 
Kaufman admitted that in the interview two days prior to trial he 
told defense counsel that he could not remember searching the 
entire car (R. 419). Counsel then elicited an admission that, 
during that interview, Officer Kaufman remembered where he was 
when he got Thurgood's transmission to pull the Escort over, 
remembered that he saw no furtive movements, remembered that he 
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approached the driver's side first and that Thurgood went to 
passenger's side, remembered that they approached the car 
simultaneously, remembered that he asked the driver why he went 
to Pioneer Park, remembered that the driver told him that he had 
gone there to see a friend, remembered asking the driver why 
driver took so long to pull over, remembered that the driver 
responded that he did not see Officer Kaufman, remembered that 
the driver took three quarters of a block to pull over, 
remembered that he kept the driver and rear passenger in the car 
three to four minutes, remembered that they detained the about 
twenty minutes more, but that he did not remember whether he 
searched the Escort (R. 444-46) . In closing argument, counsel 
also relied on the change to attack the credibility of the 
State's case by arguing that the case seemed to get better as 
time passed (R. 641). 
Third, as previously argued, defendant's version, although 
consistent with the evidence was not credible. 
Finally, as noted in the previous argument, the State 
introduced overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, including 
his confession to the crime. 
Based on the above, even if counsel had known about Officer 
Kaufman's enhanced memory, there would not exist a reasonable 
24 
likelihood of a more favorable result. See State v. Carter, 707 
P.2d at 662 (failure to disclose inculpatory evidence was 
harmless error in light of other substantial evidence introduced 
at trial). 
Defendant's appellate argument amounts to nothing more than 
a complaint that Officer Kaufman's change in memory meant that 
his trial counsel made a representation in opening argument that 
the evidence ultimately did not support- This complaint fails to 
make a credible argument that the failure to inform defense 
counsel about the memory change impaired defendant's defense, let 
alone that knowing about it creates the probability of a more 
favorable result. First, depriving defendant of arguing that no 
one searched the entire car cannot, by itself, establish an 
impairment to the defense: defendant could not rely on an untrue 
version of the events, and, as established above, he presented a 
defense based on the evidence introduced. 
Second, defendant cannot rely on a general taint to the 
defense's credibility. Even though counsel represented that no 
one had searched the car, she also established that her statement 
was true based on what Officer Kaufman had previously told her 
(R. 421). Therefore, Officer Kaufman's testimony established 
that counsel had not lied to the jury; rather, she recounted the 
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facts as the State had presented them to her. 
Because this record establishes that no reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result existed, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argue above, the State requests that the 
Court affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a 
new trial. 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting data as required in 
this section shall be assumed by the submitting drug outlet. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37-7.5, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1995, ch. 333, J 4 
1995, ch. 333, § 3. makes the act effective on July 1,1995. 
58-37-8- Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
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substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child* as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency* means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Xb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2XaXii) through 
(2XaXvii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
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(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or fiirnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veteri-
narian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5Xb) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondary 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5Xa)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5XaXi) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5Xa). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the' 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to Vi the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. For violations of this section, this subsection 
supersedes Section 77-18-4. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9Xa). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9Xa) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb). 
(d) For violations of this section, Subsection (9) supersedes Section 
76-3-203.5. 
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(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controUed substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitio-
ner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, 5 8; 1972, ch. 22, 
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, i 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 19S5, 
ch. 146, § 1; 19S6, ch. 196, $ 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 8; 1988, ch, 95, § 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, i 1; 1989, ch. 
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
1990, ch. 161, § 1; 1990, ch. 163, § 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
§ 4; 1991, ch. 268, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, 5 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added the last 
sentence in Subsection (9Xa) and rewrote Sub-
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